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Abstract 
Various violations of the human rights of ordinary people and 
human rights defenders have been reported in Zimbabwe since 
the late 1980s. It is widely acknowledged that such violations 
have been perpetrated mostly by the government through its 
different organs for political and other related reasons. Human 
rights violations were also easily committed against ordinary 
people and human rights defenders because there was no 
Constitution that adequately protected such people's 
fundamental human rights (including their civil and political 
rights and their socio-economic rights) in Zimbabwe. Given this 
background, the article discusses the protection of human rights 
in Zimbabwe, in the light of the Zimbabwe Constitution 
Amendment Act 20 of 2013 (Zimbabwe Constitution 2013). This 
is done in order to investigate whether the promotion, 
protection, enforcement and respect for human rights in 
Zimbabwe has now improved. To this end, the functions of 
selected national human rights institutions and other related 
role-players, namely civil society, the judiciary, the law 
enforcement organs and the Zimbabwe Human Rights 
Commission, are briefly discussed first. Secondly, the functions 
of selected regional and international institutions, namely the 
Southern African Development Community, the African Union 
and the United Nations are discussed in relation to the 
protection of human rights in Zimbabwe. Thereafter, concluding 
remarks and possible recommendations that could be utilised to 
combat human rights violations and enhance the protection of 
human rights in Zimbabwe are provided. 
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1  Introduction  
Several violations of the human rights of ordinary people and of defenders 
of human rights have been perpetrated by government officials and other 
related unscrupulous persons in Zimbabwe since the late 1980s.1 It is 
widely acknowledged that such violations were perpetrated mostly by the 
government through its different organs for political and other related 
reasons.2 A number of human rights violations were also easily committed 
against ordinary people and human rights defenders because there was 
no specific Constitution that adequately protected such people's 
fundamental human rights3 in Zimbabwe.4 Given this background, the 
article discusses the protection of human rights in Zimbabwe in the light of 
the Zimbabwe Constitution Amendment Act 20 of 2013.5 This is done in 
order to investigate whether the promotion, protection, enforcement and 
                                            
*  Howard Chitimira. LLB, LLM (UFH), LLD (NMMU). Associate Professor, Faculty of 
Law, North-West University. E-mail: Howard.Chitimira@nwu.ac.za. 
**  Pontsho Mokone. LLB, LLM (NWU). E-mail: pontshophila@gmail.com. This article 
was influenced in part by Mokone's LLB mini-dissertation entitled An Analysis of 
Torture as a Human Rights Violation in Zimbabwe. In this regard, she wishes to 
acknowledge the expert input of Prof H Chitimira. 
1  See Kersting Constitution in Transition 7-309, on the promotion and protection of 
fundamental human rights in Zimbabwe; Mhodi 2013 SAPR/PL 383, 384-397; 
International Crisis Group Zimbabwe: Waiting for the Future 2-19; Amnesty 
International 2013 Zimbabwe: Human Rights Agenda 5, 6-22; De Bourbon 2003 
AHRLJ 195, 196-221. 
2  Dziva, Dube and Manatsa 2013 IJHSSI 83-91; also see related comments by 
Amnesty International 2006 http://www.amnesty.org/en 
/library/asset/AFR46/005/2006/en/dom-AFR460052006en.html; Zimbabwe Human 
Rights NGO Forum Zimbabwe Human Rights 1, 2-67; Amnesty International 2013 
Walk the Talk 6-30; Anon 2006 http://www.kubatana.net/html/archive/urbdev/ 
060601reuters.asp?sector=URBDEV&year=0&range_start=1; Gwenhamo, Fedderke 
and de Kadt 2012 Journal of Peace Research 593, 594-601. 
3  These also include their civil and political rights as well as their socio-economic 
rights. 
4  Dzinesa Zimbabwe's Constitutional Reform Process 1, 2-13; Manyatera and Fombad 
2014 CILSA 89, 90-108; Chiduza 2014 PELJ 368, 369-409; Mavedzenge and Coltart 
2014 https://constitutionallythinking.files.wordpress.com/2014/10/a-constitutional-
law-guide-towards-understanding-zimbabwes-fundamental-socio-economic-and-
cultural-human-rights.pdf 5-57. 
5  Zimbabwe Constitution Amendment Act 20 of 2013, hereinafter referred to as the 
Zimbabwe Constitution 2013. Notably, this article is mainly focused on the role of 
selected human rights institutions and related role-players in the protection of human 
rights in Zimbabwe under the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013. Consequently, a detailed 
comparative analysis of such human rights protection under the Lancaster House 
Constitution of Zimbabwe Order 1979 (SI 1979/1600) as amended by Amendment 
Act 1 of 2009 which introduced amendment 19 of 2009 on 13 February 2009 
(Lancaster House Constitution 1979) and the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013 is beyond 
the scope of this article.  
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respect for human rights in Zimbabwe has now improved.6 To this end, the 
functions of selected national human rights institutions and other related 
role-players, namely civil society, the judiciary, the law enforcement 
organs and the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC) are briefly 
discussed first. Secondly, the functions of selected regional and 
international institutions, namely the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC),7 the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) 
are discussed in relation to the protection of human rights in Zimbabwe.  
The authors concur with Reif that independent human rights institutions 
are established, promoted and protected through the Constitutions, laws 
and other relevant regulations in several jurisdictions.8 Accordingly, the 
main functions of independent human rights institutions are inter alia to 
promote and protect the fundamental human rights of all the people in 
their respective countries.9 These institutions can promote good 
governance in any country in a number of ways. For instance, 
independent human rights institutions and/or human rights ombudsman 
bodies can investigate human rights violations in order to improve the 
legality, fairness and accountability of any governmental administration.10 
Furthermore, national human rights institutions can enhance the protection 
of human rights in any state by acting as catalysts for the domestic 
implementation of its international human rights treaties and obligations.11 
In relation to this, the authors submit that although human rights 
institutions in Zimbabwe, as in many other countries, do not have the 
power to make binding decisions in matters involving human rights 
violations and maladministration by the government or other persons, they 
could still play a pivotal role in the promotion and protection of human 
rights in Zimbabwe.12 Thereafter, concluding remarks and possible 
recommendations that could be utilised to combat human rights violations 
and enhance the protection of human rights in Zimbabwe are provided.  
                                            
6  Robertson Judicial Independence 3, 4-5; Gwenhamo, Fedderke and de Kadt 2012 
Journal of Peace Research 594-601; Reif 2000 Harv Hum Rts J 1-69. 
7  Malan and Cilliers SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security 1-11. 
8  Reif 2000 Harv Hum Rts J 3-7. 
9  Reif 2000 Harv Hum Rts J 1-7. 
10  Reif 2000 Harv Hum Rts J 1-3. 
11  Reif 2000 Harv Hum Rts J 1-3. 
12  Sections 232-237 of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013. 
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2 The role of national human rights institutions and 
related role-players in Zimbabwe 
2.1 The role of the judiciary 
It is submitted that the judiciary plays a key role in the protection, 
promotion and fulfilling of human rights in any democratic country.13 
Accordingly, the independence of the judiciary does not only guarantee 
the protection of human rights but it also upholds the rule of law in any 
country.14 Be that as it may, it is submitted that the judiciary has in some 
instances failed to protect the people's fundamental human rights, 
especially before the enactment of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013.15 
Notably, the executive and its organs have in some instances refused to 
enforce binding court orders and decisions that were seemingly 
unfavourable and detrimental to the aspirations of the Zimbabwe African 
National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF).16 For instance, it is reported 
that the army and police agencies refused to obey an order of the 
Supreme Court to release journalists Mark Chavunduka and Raymond 
Choto, who were allegedly illegally abducted and held by military security 
officers in connection with a story they had published about a failed coup 
in Zimbabwe.17 Similarly, Justice James Devittie ruled that the murder 
case involving the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) activists 
Blessing Chiminya and Talent Mabika, who were allegedly executed by 
being burnt alive by some ZANU-PF activists during the 2000 elections, 
should be investigated by the relevant authorities.18 Nevertheless, no such 
investigations were successfully conducted by law enforcement authorities 
and the perpetrators of the aforesaid murders have not been prosecuted 
to date.19 Furthermore, the executive has sometimes manipulated, 
                                            
13  Asmal and James Spirit of the Nation 21. 
14  Chiduza Significance of Judicial Independence 57-59. 
15  Zimbabwe Human Rights Non-Governmental Organisation Forum 2005 
http://hrforumzim.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/SR23-Zimbabwe-Facts-and-
Fictions-An-Audit-of-the-Recommendations-of-the-Fact-Finding-Mission-of-the-
ACHPR1.pdf 1, 23-31; Madhuku 2002 J Afr L 232-258, for further related discussion. 
16  Zimbabwe Human Rights Non-Governmental Organisation Forum 2005 
http://hrforumzim.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/SR23-Zimbabwe-Facts-and-
Fictions-An-Audit-of-the-Recommendations-of-the-Fact-Finding-Mission-of-the-
ACHPR1.pdf 24. 
17  Mark Chavunduka and Raymond Choto v Ministry of Defence (2000) ZLR (SC). 
18  Zimbabwe Human Rights Non-Governmental Organisation Forum 2005 
http://hrforumzim.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/SR23-Zimbabwe-Facts-and-
Fictions-An-Audit-of-the-Recommendations-of-the-Fact-Finding-Mission-of-the-
ACHPR1.pdf 27. 
19  Zimbabwe Human Rights Non-Governmental Organisation Forum 2005 
http://hrforumzim.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/SR23-Zimbabwe-Facts-and-
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intimidated and issued unwarranted attacks on the judiciary and the legal 
profession as a whole in order to negatively influence the role of the 
judges20 and lawyers in relation to the protection of human rights in 
Zimbabwe.21 In this regard, the executive's negative influence on the 
Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) to oppose the initial ruling of the 
Electoral Court judge, Justice Tendai Uchena,22 who had correctly decided 
that Roy Bennett (MDC candidate) was eligible to contest for the Member 
of Parliament seat in Chimanimani constituency in March 2005, is a case 
in point.23  
As indicated above, the executive's direct and indirect interference with the 
independence of the judiciary could have caused the Zimbabwean 
judiciary to lose the respect, confidence and trust of the nation's citizens. 
For instance, some aggrieved persons in Zimbabwe have sought their 
remedies in the courts of other countries. The National Commissioner of 
the South African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights 
Litigation Centre24 is a case in point. Moreover, due to the increase in the 
number of cases of human rights violations in Zimbabwe, many such 
cases have been brought before the African Commission (AC) to date.25 In 
                                                                                                                       
Fictions-An-Audit-of-the-Recommendations-of-the-Fact-Finding-Mission-of-the-
ACHPR1.pdf 27. 
20  Madhuku 2006 SAPR/PL 345, 346-369, for related comments. 
21  Zimbabwe Human Rights Non-Governmental Organisation Forum 2005 
http://hrforumzim.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/SR23-Zimbabwe-Facts-and-
Fictions-An-Audit-of-the-Recommendations-of-the-Fact-Finding-Mission-of-the-
ACHPR1.pdf 25-30. 
22  Anon 2005 http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/old/mar18_2005.html#link10 page 
number unknown. 
23  Roy Leslie Bennett v The Constituency Election Officer, Chimanimani Constituency 
EP1/05; Zimbabwe Human Rights Non-Governmental Organisation Forum 2005 
http://hrforumzim.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/SR23-Zimbabwe-Facts-and-
Fictions-An-Audit-of-the-Recommendations-of-the-Fact-Finding-Mission-of-the-
ACHPR1.pdf 28. 
24  National Commissioner of the South African Police Service v Southern Africa Human 
Rights Litigation Centre 2013 ZASCA 168 (27 November 2013) were it was held 
inter alia that the South African Police Service (SAPS) was obliged to investigate the 
crimes against humanity of torture that were allegedly committed against the 
members of the MDC by the members of the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), in 
terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Constitution of South 
Africa), the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002 and the international law 
obligations of South Africa; also see Mike Campbell (Pty) Ltd v Minister of National 
Security Responsible for Land Reform and Resettlement (124/06) [2008] ZWSC 1; 
Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick 2013 5 SA 325 (CC), were it was 
held inter alia that the government of Zimbabwe was obliged to compensate the 
evicted farmers in terms of the initial order of the Southern African Development 
Community Tribunal (SADCT).  
25  Such cases are usually filed in accordance with art 56 of the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights (1981) (African Charter); see further Chiduza 
Significance of Judicial Independence 57. 
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this regard the AC has on several occasions submitted that there were no 
effective domestic remedies for the victims of alleged human rights 
violations in Zimbabwe.26 This could imply that both the executive and the 
judiciary have sometimes failed to adequately and consistently protect the 
fundamental human rights of all the people in Zimbabwe.27  
It is encouraging, however, to note that the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013 
has brought about several changes that are generally aimed at revamping 
the promotion and protection of all the people's human rights in 
Zimbabwe.28 For instance, the independence of the judiciary is adequately 
entrenched under the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013, since all the relevant 
courts are expressly required to be independent and subject only to the 
Constitution and the law.29 In the same light, all the courts are obliged to 
promote the rule of law and democratic governance by applying the law 
impartially, expeditiously and without fear, favour or prejudice.30 
Furthermore, a number of guidelines are provided to enable members of 
the judiciary to exercise their duties ethically and professionally.31 For 
example, members of the judiciary are required to: recuse themselves 
from any political activities; timeously carry out their duties to ensure 
justice for all affected persons, and to safeguard human rights and the rule 
of law.32 Another change introduced by the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013 is 
that the Constitutional Court is now the highest court in relation to all 
                                            
26  For instance, see Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights v The Government of 
Zimbabwe Muzerengwa Buhera ACHPR Communication No 306/05; Zimbabwe 
Lawyers for Human Rights, SADC Lawyers Association, Law Association of Zambia, 
Tanzania Law Society v the Government of Zimbabwe 
ACHPR/LPROT/COMM/ZIM/321; Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, Human 
Rights Trust of Southern Africa v The Government of Zimbabwe Forced Evictions 
Hopley – Porta Farm and Hatcliffe Communities ACHPR Communication No 314/05. 
See further Chiduza Significance of Judicial Independence 57. 
27  Chiduza Significance of Judicial Independence 57. 
28  Sections 162-193 of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013. 
29  Section 164(1) of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013. Notably, despite the fact that s 
79B of the Lancaster House Constitution 1979 also promoted the independence of 
the judiciary, its provisions were narrower than those contained in s 164 of the 
Zimbabwe Constitution 2013. For instance, s 79B of the Lancaster House 
Constitution 1979 did not emphasise the importance of the impartiality and 
effectiveness of the courts for the purposes of promoting the rule of law and 
democratic governance in Zimbabwe. Thus, unlike s 164 of the Zimbabwe 
Constitution 2013, s 79B of the Lancaster House Constitution 1979 did not expressly 
provide any possible measures on how the state could assist the courts to promote 
and protect the impartiality, dignity, accessibility, effectiveness and independence of 
the judiciary in Zimbabwe. 
30  Sections 164(1) and (2) of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013. 
31  Section 165 of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013. 
32  Section 165 of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013. 
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constitutional matters in Zimbabwe.33 Moreover, unlike the former position 
under the Lancaster House Constitution 1979,34 the Zimbabwe 
Constitution 2013 provides that the appointment of judges must be fair and 
transparent to ensure that relevantly qualified persons are appointed.35 
The Zimbabwe Constitution 2013 also provides for the establishment of an 
independent and impartial Judicial Service Commission (JSC).36  
Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether the provisions of the 
Zimbabwe Constitution 2013 will be consistently and effectively enforced 
to promote the independence of the judiciary and the protection of human 
rights in Zimbabwe.37 For instance, members of the executive are still 
negatively interfering with the independence of the judiciary.38 Put 
differently, despite the enactment of the relevant provisions of the 
Zimbabwe Constitution 2013, members of the executive are still having 
some direct and/or indirect interference with the independence of the 
judiciary in Zimbabwe. For instance, due to such interference from the 
executive there are still some incidents of human rights violations which 
the courts are either reluctant or unwilling to adjudicate upon to date. The 
unlawful delays that were associated with Linda Masarira (a human rights 
activist)'s trial and the recent criticism by some government officials of the 
High Court judgement by David Mangota J, who eventually ordered her 
release from prison after she had been incarcerated for about three 
months, is a case in point.39 In this regard, despite the fact that regional 
and international laws are usually functional at state level only after their 
provisions have been incorporated into the relevant domestic or national 
laws, it is submitted that the independence of the judiciary should be 
protected in accordance with the relevant regional and international laws.40 
                                            
33  Section 167 read with ss 166 and 163 of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013. 
34  Section 79B read with ss 84 to 87 of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013. 
35  Section 180(2) of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013; see further Chiduza Significance 
of Judicial Independence 274. 
36  Sections 189-191 of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013; Chiduza Significance of 
Judicial Independence 274-275. 
37  Chiduza Significance of Judicial Independence 273-275. 
38  Anon 2015 http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-20865-Mugabe+bullies+judges+ 
on+Mutasa,+MDC-T/news.aspx page number unknown; Anon 2015 
http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-21072-
Moyo+defends+Mugabe+over+judges+threat/news.aspx page number unknown; 
Robertson Judicial Independence 4-5. 
39  Ncube 2016 https://www.newsday.co.zw/2016/09/27/high-court-frees-pro-democracy 
-activist-masarira/ page number unknown. 
40  See Principle 1 of the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary (1985); the International Bar Association Minimum Standards of Judicial 
Independence (1982); the Montreal Universal Declaration on the Independence of 
Justice (1983); art 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) (UDHR); 
art 7 of the African Charter; the United Nations Basic Principles on the 
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Furthermore, the powers of the executive, especially the president, in the 
appointment,41 removal42 and the remuneration of judges43 still pose a 
threat to the independence of the judiciary and the protection of human 
rights in Zimbabwe. In other words, the fact that the president still has the 
power to initiate and unilaterally appoint a tribunal to investigate concerns 
relating to the removal of a judge44 as well as the power to approve the 
salaries of judges45 could give him an opportunity to directly interfere with 
the independence of the judiciary. For example, the president can reduce 
or increase the salary of judges, especially where the decisions of the 
judiciary could be detrimental to him or his government, in order to 
influence the decisions of the courts.46 Moreover, notwithstanding the fact 
that the JSC is obliged to conduct public interviews of prospective 
judges,47 the fact that the president still has a huge grip on the 
appointment of judges could continue to give rise to biased and/or 
politically-related appointments48 that negatively affect the protection of 
human rights for all the people of Zimbabwe in the future.  
2.2  The role of the ZHRC 
The ZHRC was initially established in 2009 under the Lancaster House 
Constitution 1979,49 as an independent body that inter alia promotes the 
protection, awareness, development and attainment of fundamental 
human rights and related freedoms in Zimbabwe.50 This indicates that 
prior to 2009 no such watchdog and/or oversight body for the promotion 
                                                                                                                       
Independence of the Judiciary (1985); the Latimer House Guidelines on the 
Independence of the Judiciary (1998); and the Universal Principles of Judicial 
Independence for the SADC (2004). See further Slinn "Latimer House Guidelines for 
the Commonwealth" 17-29. 
41  Section 180 of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013.  
42  Sections 187(2)-(8), (10) of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013. 
43  Section 188(1) of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013. 
44  Sections 187(2)-(8), (10) of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013. 
45  Section 188(1) of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013; Chiduza Significance of Judicial 
Independence 271-275. 
46  See related comments by Anon 2014 http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-13854-
chidyausiku+attacks+govt+over+salaries/news.aspx page number unknown.  
47  Section 180(2)(c) of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013.  
48  For instance, it has remained questionable why Godfrey Guwa Chidyausiku was 
appointed the Chief Justice in Zimbabwe although he is directly affiliated to the 
ZANU-PF, where he was a Member of Parliament and later appointed the deputy 
Minister of Local Government and Housing and the deputy Minister of Justice. See 
Anon 2001 http://allafrica.com/stories/200108100274.html 1; Machipisa 2001 
http://www.ipsnews.net/2001/03/politics-zimbabwe-a-top-judge-appointed-new-chief-
justice/ 2. 
49  See s 100R of the Lancaster House Constitution 1979. 
50  Maveneka 2015 https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/download/8775 5. 
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and protection of human rights existed in Zimbabwe.51 Moreover, at the 
time of the establishment of the ZHRC there was no enabling legislation 
for it to perform its functions effectively.52 Consequently, the ZHRC 
commenced its duties only in March 201053 and became fully operational 
in 2012 after the enabling legislation was enacted.54 Accordingly, the 
ZHRC now performs its functions in terms of the Zimbabwe Constitution 
201355 and the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act. The ZHRC now 
has relatively broad functions and powers that are enshrined in the 
Zimbabwe Constitution 2013.56 For example, the ZHRC now has the 
powers to: (a) promote the protection, development, attainment, 
awareness of and respect for human rights and related freedoms at all 
levels of society; (b) receive complaints from the public and take relevant 
action, monitor, assess and ensure the observance of human rights and 
freedoms; (c) protect the public against the abuse of power and 
maladministration by the government and officers of public institutions; (d) 
investigate itself or direct the Commissioner General of Police to 
investigate the conduct of any authority or person accused of violating 
other people's human rights and freedoms; and (e) encourage the 
Parliament and other relevant authorities to take effective measures for 
redress and/or the prosecution of offenders.57 This could be prima facie 
proof that the government is now more committed to putting an end to 
human rights violations in Zimbabwe.58 
Nevertheless, despite the positive developments stated above, it is 
submitted that the mere fact that the ZHRC is now fully functional does not 
by itself guarantee the adequate promotion, realisation and protection of 
human rights in Zimbabwe.59 In this regard it is submitted that several 
factors such as the independence, appointment of the chairperson and 
other members of the ZHRC, prevailing working conditions, accessibility, 
accountability and the actual mandate of the ZHRC must be carefully 
                                            
51  Chiduza Significance of Judicial Independence 293. 
52  Maveneka 2015 https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/download/8775 5. 
53  Maveneka 2015 https://erc.undp.org/evaluation/documents/download/8775 5. 
54  Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act [Chapter 10:30] 2 of 2012, hereinafter 
referred to as Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act; see further Chiduza 
Significance of Judicial Independence 293. 
55  Sections 242-244 of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013. 
56  Section 243 of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013. 
57  Section 243 of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013. 
58  Chiduza 2015 LDD 148-174; Zimbabwe Human Rights Non-Governmental 
Organisation Forum 2011 http://hrforumzim.org/wp-content/uploads/2011.pdf 1. 
59  Chiduza 2015 LDD 151-171; Chiduza Significance of Judicial Independence 293-
294; Reif 2000 Harv Hum Rts J 23. 
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defined and provided to enable it to execute its functions effectively.60 In 
this light and to promote the legitimacy and credibility of the ZHRC,61 the 
government and all the relevant stakeholders in Zimbabwe should 
consider putting adequate practical measures in place to ensure that the 
ZHRC is fully independent so that it can perform its functions without fear, 
favour or prejudice.62 The government and all the relevant stakeholders in 
Zimbabwe should also ensure that the members of the ZHRC are not 
involved in political activities.63 In addition, the government and all the 
relevant stakeholders must ensure that the appointment and removal of 
members of the ZHRC are transparently and impartially done to avoid any 
biased removal of such members and/or the appointment of members that 
do not have the relevant expertise.64 This transparency and impartiality is 
unlikely to be achieved in the near future, because the president is 
constitutionally empowered to appoint the chairperson and other members 
of the ZHRC without being expressly bound by the advice of the JSC and 
the Committee on Standing Rules and Orders (CSRO).65 It is submitted 
that this flaw could give rise to biased and politically-related appointments 
to the ZHRC by the president. For instance, the appointment of the former 
chairperson of the ZHRC (Mr Jacob Mudenda, a former ZANU-PF 
Governor of Matabeleland North) was reportedly biased and unfairly 
conducted.66 Mr Jacob Mudenda's political connections with ZANU-PF 
enabled him to be controversially elected as a ZANU-PF Member of 
Parliament in 2013 and as the speaker of Parliament while he was still the 
chairperson of the ZHRC.67 In this light, the authors concur with Reif, who 
argues that individuals who have not been actively and/or previously 
involved in politics should be appointed to head or become members of 
national human rights institutions in any country.68 Accordingly, individuals 
who were not previously or currently active members of any political 
                                            
60  Chiduza 2015 LDD 151-171; Chiduza Significance of Judicial Independence 292-
302; Reif 2000 Harv Hum Rts J 2. 
61  UN Centre for Human Rights National Human Rights Institutions 37. 
62  Section 235 of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013. 
63  Section 236 of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013. 
64  Section 242 read with ss 232-237 of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013. 
65  Section 242 of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013. 
66  Mushava 2013 http://www.newsday.co.zw/2013/02/20/mugabe-tsvangirai-misfire/; 
Chiduza Significance of Judicial Independence 295.  
67  Chiduza Significance of Judicial Independence 295-297; Mushava 2013 
http://www.newsday.co.zw/2013/02/20/mugabe-tsvangirai-misfire/; also see related 
comments by Anon 2013 http://www.newzimbabwe.com/news-12173-MDC-
T+to+boycott+parliament+opening/news.aspx 2.  
68  Reif 2000 Harv Hum Rts J 27; also see Guiding Principles Relating to the Status of 
National Institutions (1993), hereinafter referred to as the Paris Principles, for further 
discussion on the Paris Principles and the standards that govern independent 
human rights institutions. 
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party69 and who have the relevant qualifications must be appointed to 
head or become members of the ZHRC. 
It is further submitted that the government and all the relevant persons 
should provide conducive working conditions for the members of the 
ZHRC to enable them to execute their duties without any undue 
interference from the executive and/or without the fear of reprisals and 
dismissals.70 Such conditions include adequate security of tenure,71 
protection from arbitrary removal from office,72 adequate resources and 
remuneration of members, and absolute financial independence of the 
ZHRC.73 However, it remains to be seen whether these conditions will be 
adequately and consistently provided in Zimbabwe. For instance, the 
president solely is empowered to appoint members of the tribunal that 
hears any matter regarding the removal of the members of the ZHRC.74 
Consequently, it is possible for the president to circumvent the relevant 
provisions of the Constitution75 and arbitrarily remove any member of the 
ZHRC from office by constituting the aforesaid tribunal on a political and/or 
partisan basis. Moreover, given the prevailing economic challenges in 
Zimbabwe, it is highly unlikely that the government will consistently 
promote the financial independence of the ZHRC and provide adequate 
resources and remuneration for the members of the ZHRC in the near 
future.76 
Furthermore, the ZHRC must be accessible77 to all persons to enable 
them to enable them to timeously report human rights violations and/or 
seek redress for such violations. Put differently, the ZHRC should have 
offices in all the provinces (including rural towns and rural villages) of 
Zimbabwe to increase the awareness of the existence of legally protected 
                                            
69  Reif 2000 Harv Hum Rts J 27. 
70  Section 235 of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013; also see s 7 of the Zimbabwe 
Human Rights Commission Act for further analysis of the independence and 
impartiality of the ZHRC. 
71  For instance, members of the ZHRC may hold office for a term of five years and are 
eligible for reappointment for another term of office not exceeding five years. S 3(1) 
of First Schedule of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act; Chiduza 
Significance of Judicial Independence 298-299.  
72  Section 237 of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013; also see s 20 of the Zimbabwe 
Human Rights Commission Act.  
73  Section 17 of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act.  
74  See s 20(4) of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act.  
75  Section 237 of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013.  
76  Anon 2013 http://m.news24.com/news24/Africa/Zimbabwe/Zim-appoints-new-rights-
election-chiefs-20130218; Chiduza 2015 LDD 161-164.  
77  Reif 2000 Harv Hum Rts J 26. 
H CHITIMIRA & P MOKONE  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  12 
human rights across the country.78 In this regard, the government should 
provide adequate resources79 to the ZHRC to enable it to conduct some 
human rights-related awareness and educational programmes for the 
benefit of all persons in Zimbabwe. In the same vein, the government 
should ensure that the ZHRC has a clearly defined and uncompromised 
broader mandate80 for the protection and promotion of human rights in 
Zimbabwe. This could help the ZHRC to timeously investigate all the 
complaints of human rights violations from aggrieved persons in 
accordance with the Zimbabwe Constitution 201381 and the relevant law.82 
Be that as it may, it is interesting to note that the ZHRC is accountable for 
all its actions (omissions and commissions) to the Parliament, while the 
Parliament is legally obliged to consider any report from the ZHRC.83 In 
this regard, it is submitted that such accountability and reporting duties on 
the part of the ZHRC could improve the protection of human rights in 
Zimbabwe if they are consistently enforced. Nonetheless, the fact that the 
ZHRC may submit its reports to Parliament only through the relevant 
Minister could give rise to obstructive bureaucracy and negative 
interference from the Minister. For instance, the Minister might reject a 
report from the ZHRC, especially if it criticises and/or exposes human 
rights violations by the government or its organs. 
2.3  The role of civil society  
Civil society includes families, academics, defenders of human rights,84 
non-profit organisations (NPOs), trade unions, private voluntary 
organisations (PVOs), religious organisations, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and other related civil society organisations (CSOs) 
that voluntarily promote the socio-economic and political interests of all the 
individuals in and citizens of a country.85 All members of civil society have 
                                            
78  Chiduza Significance of Judicial Independence 299-300. 
79  Reif 2000 Harv Hum Rts J 26; the UNDP 2014 http://www.zw.undp.org/ 
content/zimbabwe/en/home/operations/projects/democratic_governance/capacity-
building-support-to-the-zimbabwe-human-rights-commissio.html 1. 
80  Reif 2000 Harv Hum Rts J 25, related comments on the mandate of independent 
human rights institutions. 
81  See s 243 of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013. 
82  See the relevant provisions of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act.  
83  Section 244(2) read with s 323 of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013; Chiduza 
Significance of Judicial Independence 301-302. 
84  In Zimbabwe, the defenders of human rights usually include human rights activists 
and members of opposition political parties. See the Zimbabwe Human Rights Non-
Governmental Organisation Forum 2013 http://reliefweb.int/sites/ 
reliefweb.int/files/resources/Who-will-defend-the-human-rights-defenders.pdf 3.  
85  Maseng State, Civil Society and Underdevelopment 1. 
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a key role in the promotion and protection of human rights86 in many 
democratic countries, especially in developed jurisdictions. Put differently, 
civil society complements the role of national human rights institutions in 
the promotion, protection and realisation of human rights in most 
democratic countries.87 Similar views are echoed by Maseng, who argues 
that the role and mandate of civil society is usually manifested in the 
following two ways: 
One is democratic consolidation and the other is democratic transitions. In 
democratic consolidation civil society plays a role through the support and 
maintenance of democratic principles and institutions. Equally, in democratic 
transitions civil society plays a major role in mobilising pressure for political 
change.88  
In this light, some regional and international instruments have been 
agreed to globally to promote the role of civil society in the protection of 
human rights globally.89 For example, the Declaration on Human Rights 
Defenders protects the rights of human rights defenders and CSOs 
globally. Such rights include inter alia the right to discuss and develop 
human rights ideas and advocate their acceptance,90 the right to criticise 
state institutions and their agencies and/or to make proposals to improve 
their functioning,91 and the right to provide legal assistance or other 
relevant assistance to promote human rights globally.92 Nonetheless, 
despite these international efforts to entrench the significance of the 
defenders of human rights and other members of civil society in the 
promotion and protection of human rights, their work has been severely 
undermined and limited in Zimbabwe, especially from the 1990s to date.93 
In other words, although both the state and civil society working together 
contributed significantly to the attainment of independence and the 
development of Zimbabwe in the late 1970s and early 1980s,94 very little 
                                            
86  Maseng State, Civil Society and Underdevelopment 1. 
87  See the Zimbabwe Human Rights Non-Governmental Organisation Forum 2013 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Who-will-defend-the-human-
rights-defenders.pdf 3. 
88  Maseng State, Civil Society and Underdevelopment 21. 
89  United Nations Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups 
and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognised Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1999), hereinafter referred to as the Declaration 
on Human Rights Defenders; Resolution on the Protection of Human Rights 
Defenders GA Res UN Doc A/HRC/22/L.13 (2013). 
90  Article 7 of the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders. 
91  Article 9(3)(c) of the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders.  
92  Article 8(2) of the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders; see further Chiduza 
Significance of Judicial Independence 303. 
93  Mapuva and Muyengwa 2012 PELJ 125, 134; Chiduza Significance of Judicial 
Independence 303-310. 
94  Maseng State, Civil Society and Underdevelopment 1-2. 
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or no such co-operation and contribution were achieved by the state and 
civil society in Zimbabwe from the 1990s to date. For instance, in its 
attempt to promote and protect human rights in Zimbabwe, civil society 
has had several obstacles placed in its way, such as intimidation and 
detention by the police, violent disruption of its assemblies and protests by 
the police and members of the ZANU-PF, propaganda, threats of closure 
of its organisations, frivolous court charges, and deterrence from 
participating in international and regional meetings from the 1990s to 
date.95 It is submitted that these obstacles were imposed on all members 
of civil society by the government in order to discourage them from 
exposing human rights violations in Zimbabwe.96 
Furthermore, the government has impeded the work of human rights 
defenders and other members of civil society by enacting repressive 
legislation and regulations such as the Private Voluntary Organisations Act 
(PVOA),97 the Public Order and Security Act (POSA),98 the Broadcasting 
Services Act,99 the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act 
(AIPPA)100 and the Criminal Law (Law Reform and Codification) Act.101 
This legislation has been effectively employed by the government to 
threaten, harass and intimidate all members of civil society in 
Zimbabwe.102 For instance, the POSA is constantly utilised by the police 
and other law enforcement agencies to ban bona fide public meetings and 
activities of members of civil society in Zimbabwe.103 Likewise, the work of 
the NGOs and the PVOs has been negatively restricted by the PVOA, 
which inter alia obliges all the NGOs, the PVOs and related welfare 
services organisations (WSOs) to register with the government.104 This 
                                            
95  See the Zimbabwe Human Rights Non-Governmental Organisation Forum 2013 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Who-will-defend-the-human-
rights-defenders.pdf 3-8; Chiduza Significance of Judicial Independence 302-310. 
96  See the Zimbabwe Human Rights Non-Governmental Organisation Forum 2013 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Who-will-defend-the-human-
rights-defenders.pdf 3-8. 
97  Private Voluntary Organisations Act [Chapter 17:05] 22 of 2001 (PVOA). 
98  Public Order and Security Act 5 of 2002 (POSA) as amended by the Public Order 
and Security Amendment Act 18 of 2007.  
99  Broadcasting Services Act 3 of 2001 as amended by the Broadcasting Services 
Amendment Act 19 of 2007. 
100  Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act [Chapter 10:27] 1 of 2002 
(AIPPA) as amended by the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy 
Amendment Act 20 of 2007. 
101  Criminal Law (Law Reform and Codification) Act [Chapter 9:23] 23 of 2004 as 
amended; see further the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act [Chapter 9:07], 
hereinafter referred to as the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act.  
102  Maseng State, Civil Society and Underdevelopment 2. 
103  Maseng State, Civil Society and Underdevelopment 2. 
104  Mapuva and Muyengwa 2012 PELJ 130-131. 
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presents the government with a chance to arbitrarily reject bona fide 
registration applications for certain NGOs, PVOs and/or WSOs, especially 
those that are allegedly linked to opposition political parties.105 Moreover, 
in order to control the activities of NGOs, PVOs and WSOs, the PVOA 
restricts funding or donations to all CSOs (including NGOs, PVOs and 
WSOs) by foreign organisations.106 This has severely impeded the 
protection of human rights and other related operations of many NGOs, 
PVOs and WSOs in Zimbabwe, and as a result, some of the NGOs have 
been forced to close down due to financial problems.107 In this regard, it is 
submitted that the government should consider ratifying the Declaration on 
Human Rights Defenders108 in order to protect human rights defenders 
and other members of the CSOs against intimidation, reprisals and 
violence in Zimbabwe.109 In the same vein, the government should adopt 
practical measures that: (a) create a conducive environment for all 
defenders of human rights, and other members of the CSOs; (b) promote 
and respect all the national human rights institutions that were established 
in accordance with the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013.110  
2.4  The role of law enforcement organs 
2.4.1 The duty to protect and uphold the law 
Members of the security services and/or law enforcement agencies111 play 
a crucial role in the implementation of the law to protect all people against 
human rights violations.112 Accordingly, all law enforcement agencies and 
                                            
105  Mapuva and Muyengwa 2012 PELJ 130-131; also see the PVOA General Notice 99 
of 2007 – Code of Procedure for the Registration and Operations of Non-
Governmental Organisations in Zimbabwe. 
106  PVOA General Notice 99 of 2007 – Code of Procedure for the Registration and 
Operations of Non-Governmental Organisations in Zimbabwe; see further Chiduza 
Significance of Judicial Independence 308. 
107  Chamboko 2012 http://nehandaradio.com/2012/02/19/zanu-pf-ban-of-ngos-in-
zimbabwe-self-defeating/; Chiduza Significance of Judicial 308-310. 
108  Article 2, for related comments on the countries' responsibility to respect and fulfil the 
provisions on the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders.  
109  Chiduza Significance of Judicial Independence 303-304, for related comments. 
110  Sections 232-263; Chiduza Significance of Judicial Independence 302-310. 
111  For the purposes of article, such agencies and/or organs include the defence forces 
(soldiers); the police services (ZRP); the intelligence services or the Central 
Intelligence Organisation (CIO); the prisons and correctional services; and other 
related security organisations. 
112  Article 1 of the United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials (1979) 
was adopted by General Assembly Resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979. This 
Code provides that law enforcement officials should at all times fulfil the duties that 
are imposed upon them by the law, by serving the community and by protecting all 
persons against illegal acts, consistent with the high degree of responsibility required 
by their profession. 
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other relevant authorities should consistently strive to protect all the 
people, especially vulnerable individuals, against human rights 
violations.113 All the law enforcement agencies in Zimbabwe are obliged to 
carefully and consistently execute their duties in terms of the Zimbabwe 
Constitution 2013, the relevant law, and international standards.114 For 
instance, the ZRP is obliged to perform its duties without fear or favour 
and in accordance with regional and international bodies.115 The 
Zimbabwe Constitution 2013 also provides that the ZRP is responsible for 
detecting, investigating, protecting and securing the lives and property of 
people against crime.116 The ZRP is further obliged to preserve and 
maintain internal security as well as law and order in Zimbabwe.117 Similar 
functions are also bestowed upon the ZRP in terms of the Police Act.118 
Likewise, all the members of the intelligence services must perform their 
duties in a non-partisan manner and in accordance with the Zimbabwe 
Constitution 2013.119 Prisons and correctional services members are also 
required to be non-partisan in order for them to treat all the offenders 
and/or accused persons in a fair and lawful manner, in accordance with 
the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013.120 Moreover, the Zimbabwe Constitution 
2013 stipulates that all the members of the defence forces are obliged to 
respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of all persons in a non-
partisan and professional manner.121 Despite these constitutional efforts to 
enhance human rights protection, members of the opposition political 
parties, civil society activists and other defenders of human rights have 
allegedly sometimes been subjected to violence, abduction and physical 
torture by the ZRP, the CIO and soldiers in Zimbabwe.122  
                                            
113  Chiduza Significance of Judicial Independence 280-291.  
114  Sections 206-231 of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013; also see the human rights 
standards, guidelines, principles and/or codes of conduct for law enforcement 
agencies that are enshrined in international instruments such as the United Nations 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (1984) (UN Convention against Torture), the UN Code of Conduct for 
Law Enforcement Officials; and the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965). 
115  Sections 219(1)-(3) of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013; also see Chiduza 
Significance of Judicial Independence 281.  
116  Section 219(1) of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013. 
117  Sections 219(1)(b) and (d) read with ss 208 and 223 of the Zimbabwe Constitution 
2013. 
118  Police Act [Chapter 11:10] 2 of 1995, hereinafter referred to as the Police Act, see 
the relevant provisions on preservation of law and order by the police.  
119  Section 224(2) read with s 208 of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013. 
120  Sections 227(1) and (2) read with s 208 of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013. 
121  Sections 211(3) read with ss 212, 218 and 208 of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013. 
122  The mysterious disappearance of Paul Chizuze in February 2012 and of Itai 
Dzamara in 2015 as well as the abduction of Jestina Mukoko are cases in point. See 
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2.4.2  The duty not to use excessive force 
In Zimbabwe, the use of force in effecting arrest by all law enforcement 
agencies is governed by the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act.123 For 
instance, all law enforcement officers, especially police officers, are 
required to use only a degree of force that is reasonably justifiable in the 
circumstances of a case for overcoming any resistance by the 
perpetrator.124 Where a person is killed as a result of the use of 
reasonably justifiable force, then the killing is lawful.125 In other words, the 
police and other law enforcement officials may use force only when it is 
strictly necessary and reasonable in the circumstances in order to prevent 
crime and/or effect an arrest in accordance with the relevant legislation 
and practice.126 Despite this, the law enforcement officers, especially the 
police officers, have sometimes overstepped their powers and arbitrarily 
used excessive force against defenders of human rights and/or activists, 
members of the opposition political parties, and lawyers for human 
rights.127 For instance, in 2011 Amnesty International reported that the 
ZRP was associated with the arbitrary use of excessive force and 
numerous cases of torture, assault and violence against human rights 
activists and defenders, members of opposition political parties, and those 
who criticised government policies.128 In addition, it is submitted that the 
ZRP's arbitrary use of excessive force, such as using live ammunition to 
disperse peaceful demonstrations, has culminated in the death of many 
human rights activists, such as Gift Tandare, who was an MDC 
supporter.129 Furthermore, in 2011 the ZRP violently disrupted a peaceful 
prayer meeting in Harare with teargas and canisters when they stormed a 
                                                                                                                       
Mukoko v Attorney-General [2012] ZWSC 11; Cross 2015 
http://nehandaradio.com/2015/08/16/160-days-the-disappearance-of-itai-dzamara/; 
also see the Zimbabwe Human Rights Non-Governmental Organisation Forum 2013 
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Who-will-defend-the-human-
rights-defenders.pdf 3-6; and related comments by Makwerere, Chinzete and 
Musorowegomo 2012 IJHSS 129, 133-134; the Redress Trust 2005 
http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/Amani2005.pdf 21-24. 
123  Section 42 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. 
124  Section 42(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. 
125  Section 42(2) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act. 
126  Section 42(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act.  
127  Makwerere, Chinzete and Musorowegomo 2012 IJHSS 131-133. 
128  Makwerere, Chinzete and Musorowegomo 2012 IJHSS 132. 
129  Dissel and Frank Policing and Human Rights 186; such excessive force was also 
employed by the ZRP during the forced evictions which were part of the 
Murambatsvina (Operation Restore Order) campaign in 2005.  
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church hall during prayer for peace and dispersed the congregation, which 
included several church members and community leaders.130 
2.4.3 The duty to respect and uphold the rule of law  
The rule of law could be defined as the observed body of international 
accords and treaties, state constitutions and written laws which embody 
the human rights traditions accepted virtually universally, and which 
protect individuals and order society in the nations of the world.131 The rule 
of law is important for the strengthening of democracy in any country, and 
all the law enforcement agencies in Zimbabwe should therefore carefully 
exercise their duties132 with due regard to the relevant human rights 
standards and the rule of law.133 In this light it is submitted that all the law 
enforcement agencies in Zimbabwe should carefully protect all the human 
rights that are provided in the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013,134 especially, 
the rights to life; freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment; liberty; privacy; human dignity; the freedom to 
demonstrate and petition; the freedom of expression, assembly and 
association; and the freedom to demonstrate and petition.135 It is also 
submitted that all the law enforcement agencies should consistently co-
operate with the members of the public to enhance the protection of 
human rights in Zimbabwe.136 For instance, it is reported that the law 
enforcement agencies, especially the ZRP, have to date failed to 
consistently uphold the rule of law in politically-related matters involving 
members of the opposition political parties and other human rights 
defenders in Zimbabwe.137 Moreover, it is reported that the law 
enforcement agencies, especially the ZRP, have sometimes disregarded 
the law and acted with contempt for the judiciary and court decisions in 
Zimbabwe.138 This has undermined the role of the judiciary and the rule of 
law in Zimbabwe. For instance, the ZRP and the CIO have sometimes 
                                            
130  Anon 2011 http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/apr12_2011.html; Atwood 2011 
http://www.kubatanablogs.net/kubatana/police-violently-suppress-prayer-for-peace/. 
131  Maseng State, Civil Society and Underdevelopment 17. 
132  Sections 212, 219, 224 and 231 of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013.  
133  Makwerere, Chinzete and Musorowegomo 2012 IJHSS 131-133. 
134  Sections 44-87 of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013. 
135  Makwerere, Chinzete and Musorowegomo 2012 IJHSS 131-134. 
136  Rowe Introduction to Policing 18. 
137  See related comments by the International Bar Association 2007 
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=e4d35d9f 42. 
138  Makwerere, Chinzete and Musorowegomo 2012 IJHSS 131-134; also see the 
International Bar Association 2007 http://www.ibanet.org/Document/ 
Default.aspx?DocumentUid=e4d35d9f 7.  
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allegedly conducted unlawful or arbitrary arrests139 and have tortured the 
defenders of human rights and members of the opposition political 
parties.140 Consequently, the protection and promotion of human rights 
has been severely compromised and negatively affected in Zimbabwe. In 
this regard, it is submitted that all the law enforcement agencies should 
execute their duties in accordance with the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013 
and without any interference from the government.141 It is also submitted 
that all the law enforcement agencies should not be directly or indirectly 
affiliated to any political party to combat the biased application of the law. 
In addition, any such law enforcement officials that contravene the 
Zimbabwe Constitution 2013 by their unlawful and biased application of 
the law should be tried in the relevant courts and punished without fear or 
favour. 
3 The role of regional and international human rights 
institutions and related role-players in Zimbabwe 
3.1 The role of the UN 
It is submitted that independent human rights institutions (HRIs) play an 
important role in the protection and promotion of human rights globally.142 
The significance of the HRIs has been recognised by the UN and its 
relevant organs since 1946.143 For instance, the UN Commission on 
Human Rights introduced the Guiding Principles Relating to the Status of 
National Institutions (Paris Principles) in 1992, and they were adopted by 
the General Assembly in 1993.144 These Paris Principles provide useful 
guidelines on the formation of human rights institutions as well as the 
standards and principles that must be employed by such institutions in 
order for them to perform their functions effectively.145 The Paris Principles 
                                            
139  See Fidelis Charamba v The Minister of Home Affairs (High Court) (unreported) case 
number 6420/08 where the High Court declared the abduction and secret detention 
of several abductees as unlawful and ordered their release, but they continued to be 
detained for two months.  
140  See Jestina Mukoko v The Commissioner General of Police (High Court) 
(unreported) case number 7166/08, where the police defied the order of the High 
Court to release abducted persons who were in police custody; see the International 
Bar Association 2007 http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx? 
DocumentUid=e4d35d9f 35.  
141  Chiduza Significance of Judicial Independence 280-288. 
142  Reif 2000 Harv Hum Rts J 2; Chiduza 2015 LDD 149-151. 
143  UN Centre for Human Rights National Human Rights Institutions 4-6; see further Reif 
2000 Harv Hum Rts J 3. 
144  See the Paris Principles of 1993. 
145  Chiduza Significance of Judicial Independence 291-292; Chiduza 2015 LDD 149-
151. 
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also provide the assessment and accreditation criteria for any new or 
existing HRIs, which are usually employed by the International 
Coordinating Committee's Sub-Committee on Accreditation (ICC SCA).146 
The ICC SCA is empowered to review, analyse and make 
recommendations regarding any accreditation application in order to 
ensure that all the HRIs in the member countries comply with the Paris 
Principles.147 The ICC of HRIs develops and co-ordinates the joint 
programmes and/or activities of HRIs globally.148 Moreover, the ICC of 
HRIs supports the creation of HRIs and it works hand in glove with 
international human rights organisations such as the OHCHR.149  
Furthermore, the UN General Assembly adopted the Basic Principles on 
the Independence of the Judiciary in 1985150 in order to enhance the 
protection of the independence of the judiciary in all jurisdictions globally. 
These Principles provide inter alia that the independence of the judiciary 
shall be constitutionally guaranteed by states. The same Principles 
stipulate that all governments and other institutions must respect and 
observe the independence of the judiciary in order to ensure that the 
judiciary executes its duties in accordance with the law, without any undue 
interference from the executive or any other person.151 Furthermore, the 
UN Centre for Human Rights has adopted criteria that must employed by 
all relevant persons in order to determine the independence of HRIs.152 
Nonetheless, despite these UN efforts and the importance of the universal 
protection of human rights as recognised by the Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action153 and the UDHR, very little progress has been 
achieved in this regard in Zimbabwe to date.154 For instance, as earlier 
stated,155 various human rights activists, members of the opposition 
political parties and human rights defenders have been assaulted, 
abducted, tortured, arbitrarily detained and charged with frivolous cases in 
Zimbabwe since the late 1980s. This could have been worsened by the 
fact that Zimbabwe, despite prohibiting torture in the Zimbabwe 
                                            
146  OHCHR National Human Rights Institutions 31. 
147  Chiduza 2015 LDD 150. 
148  UN Centre for Human Rights National Human Rights Institutions 66. 
149  Pohjolainen Evolution of National Human Rights Institutions 24.  
150  United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (1985). 
151  Principles 1 to 7 of the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary; 
also see Chiduza Significance of Judicial Independence 41-43.  
152  Chiduza 2015 LDD 152-153. 
153  Vienna Declaration and Program of Action (1993). 
154  See paras 2.1; 2.2; 2.3 and 2.4.1-2.4.3 above. 
155  See paras 2.1; 2.2; 2.3 and 2.4.1-2.4.3 above. 
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Constitution 2013,156 has to date not ratified the UN Convention against 
Torture. Moreover, the offering of most UN programmes to promote, 
protect and ensure the realisation of human rights, such as the UN 
election observers and humanitarian aid, have been severely restricted in 
Zimbabwe to date. 
3.2 The role of the AU 
In spite of its shortcomings, the AU has made considerable efforts to 
condemn the violation of the people' rights in Zimbabwe, especially from 
the late 1990s to date. For instance, the AC has on several occasions held 
that the ZANU-PF government was in violation of several provisions of the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR),157 particularly 
during the general elections.158 The AC has to date received several 
communications and complaints relating to human rights violations 
perpetrated by the ZANU-PF government.159 In relation to this, the AC has 
sometimes ruled that the ZANU-PF government was violating the relevant 
provisions of the ACHPR through repressive law, violence and torture 
against human rights activists, political activists and other defenders of 
human rights.160 The ZANU-PF government was also violating the relevant 
provisions of the ACHPR,161 that oblige all member states to respect and 
protect the independence of the judiciary.162 
                                            
156  Section 53 of the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013. 
157  The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981), adopted in Nairobi, 
Kenya on 27 June 1981 and entered into force on 21 October 1986. 
158  For example, it was held that the ZANU-PF government violated arts 1 and 7 of the 
African Charter through numerous human rights abuses such as voter intimidation, 
violence and torture that occurred during the 2000, 2002 and 2008 elections. See 
Chiduza Significance of Judicial Independence 58.  
159  For example, see Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe ACHPR 
Communication No 245/02; Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, Human Rights 
Trust of Southern Africa v The Government of Zimbabwe Forced Evictions Hopley – 
Porta Farm and Hatcliffe Communities ACHPR Communication No 314/05; 
Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights v The Government of Zimbabwe Muzerengwa 
Buhera ACHPR Communication No 306/05.  
160  For instance, it was held that the detention and deportation of Andrew Barclay 
Meldrum (a citizen of the United States of America who was permanently resident in 
Zimbabwe between 1980 and 2003) for allegedly publishing false information and 
contravening s 80(1)(b) of the AIPPA violated arts 7 and 26 of the ACHPR; 
Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights and Institute for Human Rights and 
Development in Africa (obo Andrew Barclay Meldrum v Zimbabwe) ACHPR 
Communication No 294/04. 
161  Article 26 of the ACHPR; Chiduza Significance of Judicial Independence 58-59; also 
see related remarks in para 2.1 above. 
162  Madebwe 2014 Midlands State U L Rev 6-19, for related comments on 
constitutionalism in Zimbabwe. 
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Furthermore, although the ACHPR provides for the establishment of 
independent HRIs to protect and promote human rights in Africa,163 the 
role of HRIs has been severely compromised and negatively impacted by 
the ZANU-PF government in Zimbabwe to date.164 The ACHPR also 
obliges all HRIs to assist the AC in the implementation of its provisions 
and the promotion of human rights in Africa.165 Be that as it may, the 
ZHRC has found it difficult to consistently comply with the provisions of the 
ACHPR, in part due to interference from the executive and lack of 
adequate funding for its programmes.166 This has also negatively affected 
the co-operation of ZHRC and other related regional and international 
human rights institutions such as the International Coordinating Committee 
of National Human Rights Institutions (ICCNHRI) and the Network of 
African National Human Rights Institutions (NANHRI).167 More may still 
need to be done on the part of the AU in order to effectively discourage 
human rights violations in Zimbabwe. This follows the fact that the AU 
failed to condemn the election-related violence, rigging and other human 
rights abuses that were allegedly committed by the ZANU-PF government 
in 2008 and 2013. In this regard, it is submitted that the ZANU-PF 
government should abide by the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013 and other 
relevant regional and international instruments in order to enhance the 
protection of human rights in Zimbabwe.168  
3.3 The role of the SADC  
3.3.1 The role of the SADC Tribunal 
The SADC is the Southern African economic community. It promotes inter 
alia the creation of a free and common trade market amongst its 
members.169 In a bid to achieve this, the SADC established the SADC 
tribunal on 18 August 2005 in accordance with the SADC Treaty of 1992, 
and the court commenced its duties on 18 November 2005.170 The SADC 
                                            
163  Article 26 of the ACHPR; also see Viljoen International Human Rights Law 389.  
164  See related remarks in para 2.2 above. 
165  Article 45 of the ACHPR; see further the ACHPR date unknown 
http://www.achpr.org/network/nhri/; Chiduza 2015 LDD 150. 
166  See related remarks in para 2.2 above; Chiduza 2015 LDD 172-173. 
167  ZHRC date unknown http://www.zhrc.org.zw/index.php/2014-07-02-07-41-
38/speeches/59-media-engagement-workshop-overview-of-the-mandate-and-work-
of-the-zimbabwe-human-rights-commission-zhrc; Chiduza 2015 LDD 172-173.  
168  Chiduza 2015 LDD 172-173.  
169  See the relevant provisions of the SADC Treaty that was adopted by the member 
states through the Windhoek Declaration of 1992; see further Cowell 2013 HR L Rev 
153-154. 
170  The SADC tribunal was adjudicated by judges appointed by the member states. See 
further art 9 of the SADC Treaty (1992); also see Moyo 2009 AHRLJ 590-614.  
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tribunal was empowered to ensure the proper implementation of the SADC 
Treaty and its subsidiary instruments by all member states.171 Moreover, 
the SADC tribunal was authorised to hear any disputes that arose from the 
member states. The SADC Treaty does not, though, expressly provide for 
the jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal in relation to human rights 
disputes.172 Consequently, the SADC Tribunal relied on the related 
provisions in the SADC Treaty173 and the SADC Protocol of the Tribunal 
and Rules of Procedure of 2000 (SADC Protocol 2000)174 to hear matters 
involving human rights violations. However, the affected persons could 
bring an action against a state only when they had exhausted all available 
domestic remedies in their jurisdictions.175 
Notwithstanding the fact that the SADC Treaty does not expressly refer to 
any specific human rights instruments and/or the protection of human 
rights except in its article 4, the SADC has to date made considerable 
efforts to ensure the protection of civil, political and other human rights in 
Zimbabwe.176 In this regard it is submitted that the SADC should 
consistently mandate its member states to promote and protect human 
rights.177 Zimbabwe, like any other member of the SADC, must be bound 
by the relevant provisions of the SADC Treaty, which promote the 
protection of human rights, democracy and the rule of law.178 The SADC 
Tribunal's efforts to hear and resolve human rights-related disputes were 
impeded in Zimbabwe. Thus, Mike Campbell and other affected farm 
owners filed cases with the SADC Tribunal alleging that their rights had 
been negatively affected by the Land Reform Programme and land 
invasions which culminated in their farms being forcefully taken by the 
government of Zimbabwe.179 The SADC Tribunal granted judgment in 
                                            
171  Article 9 of the SADC Treaty. 
172  Chiduza Significance of Judicial Independence 315.  
173  See art 4(c) of the SADC Treaty. 
174  This Protocol does not provide for the jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal in human 
rights cases. Nevertheless, related matters are dealt with in its provisions such as 
arts 15(2), 17-20 of the SADC Protocol of the Tribunal and Rules of Procedure 
(2000) (SADC Protocol 2000); see further Chiduza Significance of Judicial 
Independence 315-316. 
175  Article 15(2) of the SADC Protocol 2000. 
176  Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa date unknown 
http://www.osisa.org/openspace/zimbabwe/sadcs-role-zimbabwe; Chiduza 
Significance of Judicial Independence 314.  
177  See art 4(c) of the SADC Treaty, which obliges all member states to promote the 
protection of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. 
178  See art 4(c) of the SADC Treaty. 
179  Mike Campbell (Pty) Limited v The Republic of Zimbabwe (2/07) [2007] SADCT 1 
(13 December 2007); Mike Campbell (Pty) Limited v The Republic of Zimbabwe 
(2/2007) [2008] SADCT (28 November 2008); also see Chiduza Significance of 
Judicial Independence 317. 
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favour of Campbell and 77 other farm owners and stated that the 
government of Zimbabwe had violated articles 4(c) and 6(2) of the SADC 
Treaty. However, the government of Zimbabwe failed to comply with the 
judgment of the SADC Tribunal as well as its subsequent orders.180 
Subsequently the Zimbabwean government announced its intention to 
withdraw from the SADC Protocol 2000 in November 2009, arguing that it 
did not bind them, although they had agreed to both the SADC Protocol 
2000 and the amended SADC Treaty.181 Eventually the SADC Tribunal 
was suspended at the 2010 SADC Summit. On 17 August 2012 the 
Maputo SADC Summit resolved that a new SADC Tribunal should be 
established, but that its mandate relative to human rights would be 
confined to the interpretation of the SADC Treaty and its relevant 
Protocols in cases of disputes between member states.182 
It is submitted that the removal of the human rights jurisdiction of the 
SADC Tribunal could give rise to more human rights abuses and the 
weakening of the rule of law in the SADC member states.183 Moreover, it is 
submitted that the suspension of the SADC Tribunal has left SADC 
citizens with few or no regional remedies for any human rights violations 
by their governments.184 In this regard the authors concur with Mogoeng J, 
who correctly argues that the SADC Tribunal was established inter alia to 
ensure that the SADC member states did not undermine the objectives of 
the SADC Treaty by violating people's human rights with impunity.185 
Accordingly, a new SADC Tribunal that has the legal jurisdiction to hear 
human rights disputes should be speedily established to effectively 
enhance the protection of human rights in the SADC member states. 
3.3.2 The role of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security 
The SADC established the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security in 
1996 (SADC Organ on Politics)186 as an institutional framework for 
coordinating policies and related aspects on politics, defence, and 
                                            
180  Campbell v Republic of Zimbabwe (SADC (T) 03/2009) [2009] SADCT 1 (5 June 
2009).  
181  Cowell 2013 HR L Rev 159. 
182  Cowell 2013 HR L Rev 154; 165; SADC 2012 http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/sadc-
institutions/tribun/; arts 6 and 16 of the SADC Treaty. 
183  Cowell 2013 HR L Rev 153-154; Nathan 2011 Development Dialogue 123, 124-136; 
and Ndlovu 2011 SADC Law Journal 63, 78.  
184  Chiduza Significance of Judicial Independence 320-321. 
185  Government of the Republic of Zimbabwe v Fick 2013 5 SA 325 (CC) para 1. 
186  Gaborone Communiqué of the Southern African Development Community 
Secretariat (1996); Malan and Cilliers SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and 
Security 1-11. 
H CHITIMIRA & P MOKONE  PER / PELJ 2016 (19)  25 
security. Consequently, the SADC enacted the Protocol on Politics, 
Defence and Security Co-operation on 14 August 2001 (SADC Protocol on 
Politics) in order to provide a legal framework and objectives for the SADC 
Organ on Politics. The SADC Protocol on Politics enumerates various 
objectives for the SADC Organ on Politics such as: (a) promoting peace 
and security across Southern Africa; (b) protecting the SADC region from 
instability due to the breakdown of law and order; (c) developing a 
common foreign policy throughout the region; (d) cooperating on matters 
related to security and defence; (e) encouraging the observance of 
international human rights conventions and treaties; (f) developing 
democratic institutions and practices; and (g) encouraging the observance 
of universal human rights.187 In order to implement these objectives, the 
SADC Protocol on Politics provides a clear jurisdiction of the SADC Organ 
on Politics as well as an operating structure consisting of the Organ, the 
chairperson, the Troika and various committees.188 Accordingly, the SADC 
Organ on Politics is operated on a Troika basis in the SADC region. The 
SADC Protocol on Politics also provides guidelines for the enforcement of 
and co-operation with international agreements.189 In relation to this, the 
SADC Protocol on Politics was amended on 8 September 2009 to 
incorporate regional policing co-operation structures through the Southern 
African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO).190 
Despite these positive efforts to ensure peace, democracy and the 
protection of human rights in the SADC, the SADC Organ on Politics has 
to date struggled to consistently enforce the SADC Protocol on Politics in 
a number of member countries such as Zimbabwe, Lesotho, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Swaziland and Angola.191 For instance, 
despite numerous complaints and reports of civil, political and other 
human rights violations in Zimbabwe192 being filed with the SADC Organ 
on Politics by the opposition political parties and other defenders of human 
rights, the SADC Organ on Politics is yet to take any meaningful action to 
effectively discourage such violations in Zimbabwe.193 
                                            
187  Article 2 read with arts 6, 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 of the SADC Protocol on Politics, 
Defence and Security Co-operation (2001) (SADC Protocol on Politics). 
188  Articles 3 and 11 of the SADC Protocol on Politics. 
189  Article 15 read with arts 3, 6, 7, 10, 11 and 13 of the SADC Protocol on Politics. 
190  See para 3.4 below. 
191  Cowell 2013 HR L Rev 153-165; Malan and Cilliers SADC Organ on Politics, 
Defence and Security 1-11. 
192  Such politically related violence and human rights abuses were mostly committed 
during the 2002, 2008 and 2013 elections. 
193  Chiduza Significance of Judicial Independence 314-322, for related discussion. 
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3.4 The role of the SARPCCO 
Zimbabwe is a member of the SARPCCO. The SARPCCO194 was 
incorporated into the SADC Protocol on Politics to enhance regional 
policing and human rights norms in the SADC.195 The SARPCCO provides 
principles, guidelines and codes of conduct that are generally aimed at 
promoting human rights and effective law enforcement in the SADC.196 
Although some of the SARPCCO guidelines are not binding, they are 
generally enforced in accordance with the international law and related 
bodies that promote human rights and democracy in society.197 The 
SARPCCO Code of Conduct outlines police officers' duties and how such 
duties may be executed to protect people's human rights in the SADC.198 
For instance, police officers are prohibited from using excessive force, 
torture and any other inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment 
against accused persons.199 
Despite the existence of these SARPCCO guidelines and the Code of 
Conduct, the ZRP has sometimes failed to abide by its constitutional 
obligations and violated people's human rights, especially during elections, 
peaceful demonstrations and petitions.200 It remains to be seen whether 
the ZRP will in future consistently abide by the SARPCCO Code of 
Conduct, principles and guidelines to promote and protect human rights in 
Zimbabwe.201 
4  Concluding remarks 
As indicated above,202 the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013 brought about 
some key changes, such as the protection of the judiciary and the rule of 
                                            
194  The SARPCCO was established in 1995.  
195  See the preamble of the SARPCCO Code of Conduct, which was adopted at the 6th 
General Meeting of SARPCCO in Mauritius in August 2001.  
196  Chiduza Significance of Judicial Independence 282. 
197  See OHCHR Human Rights Standards and Practice 1; UN Code of Conduct for Law 
Enforcement Officials.  
198  Chiduza Significance of Judicial Independence 282. 
199  Articles 3 and 4 of the SARPCCO Code of Conduct; Makwerere, Chinzete and 
Musorowegomo 2012 IJHSS 133-134; the SARPCCO 2001 
http://www.apt.ch/content/files_res/SARPCCO 3. 
200  For example, the ZRP and other law enforcement agencies violated the people's 
human rights during the Operation Murambatsvina campaign of 2005 (Operation 
Restore Order); Jestina Mukoko v The Commissioner-General of Police (SC) 
(unreported) case number 293/08; Kenneth Simon Marimba v the Commissioner 
General of Police (High Court) (unreported) case number 6903/08; also see 
Makwerere, Chinzete and Musorowegomo 2012 IJHSS 132-135. 
201  Makwerere, Chinzete and Musorowegomo 2012 IJHSS 129-138. 
202  Para 2.1 above. 
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law as well as the establishment of the Constitutional Court, in order to 
revamp the promotion and protection of all people's human rights in 
Zimbabwe. Nonetheless, members of the executive are still deleteriously 
interfering with the independence of the judiciary. In this regard, it is 
submitted that the independence of the judiciary should be protected in 
accordance with relevant regional and international law.203 It is further 
suggested that several factors such as the independence of the ZHRC, 
the appointment of its chairperson and other members, the prevailing 
working conditions, accessibility, accountability and the actual mandate of 
the ZHRC must be carefully defined to enable it to execute its functions 
effectively.204 Moreover, the government should consider adopting 
practical measures that promote the functions of all defenders of human 
rights, national human rights institutions and other members of CSOs in 
accordance with the Zimbabwe Constitution 2013.205 Likewise, all law 
enforcement agencies should execute their duties in accordance with the 
Zimbabwe Constitution 2013 and without any negative interference from 
the executive.206 Lastly, it is recommended that the ZANU-PF government 
should abide by other relevant regional and international instruments in 
order to enhance the protection of human rights in Zimbabwe.207 
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